The art of compromise: an analysis of the discourse that led to the creation of article 15bis of the Rome Statute. by Caviezel, Sofia
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
The art of compromise 
An analysis of the discourse that led to the creation of article 
15bis of the Rome Statute.   
     Sofia Caviezel 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: Eva Schömer  
Term: Spring Term 2013  
Level: Bachelor’s Degree 
Course Code: RÄSK02 
 2 
 
 Abstract 
This Sociology of Law thesis looks at the negotiation process that took place within the 
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression between 2004 and 2009 and which led 
to the creation of article 15bis of the Rome Statute. The article sets out the rules regarding 
the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over crime of aggression cases, referred to 
it by States or initiated by the Prosecutor of the Court. Foucauldian theories on the effects 
of power on the production of knowledge and the productivity of discourse were used to 
analyse the process, in order to gain an understanding for how the debate on this issue 
developed in the way it did. It was found that the negotiation process contained many 
conflicting views on what the Court’s jurisdiction should be. Power was used in a strategic 
way by delegations to work towards their specific aim, and the visibility of different 
institutions shaped the way in which the discourse could be conducted. This meant that 
many compromises had to be made throughout the process in order to finally be able to 
reach an agreement regarding the Court’s jurisdiction on the crime, in time for the Review 
Conference held in 2010.  
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Abbreviations 
 
ASP Assembly of State Parties 
ICC International Criminal Court 
ICJ International Court of Justice 
SWGCA Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression 
UN United Nations 
UNGA United Nations General Assembly  
UNSC United Nations Security Council 
Terms used in this thesis 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, a 'crime of aggression' is to be understood as: 
“the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise control 
over or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, 
gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”1 
A proprio motu investigation refers to investigations initiated by the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court “on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court received from individuals or organisations”2.  
A case brought to the attention of the Court by State referral describes the situation where a case 
is referred to the Court by a State Party of the International Criminal Court (ICC)3.  
The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (SWGCA) describes a group which was set 
up as a result of the Preparatory Commission of the International Criminal Court failing to arrive 
at a decision regarding the definition and jurisdiction of a crime of aggression in 1998. It was 
open to all United Nations Member States, as well as to civil societies, and held several debates 
between 2004 and 2009, the results of which were debated at the Review Conference held in 
Kampala, Uganda in 2010.  
  
                                                             
1 UN General Assembly, op. cit., article 8bis, paragraph 1, p. 9 
2 The International Criminal Court. Situations and cases. Accessed 11-08-2013. 
3 Ibid.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 The jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court on the crime of aggression 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) was established on the 1st of July 2002. The Court was set 
up with the aim of prosecuting “the perpetrators of the most serious crimes of concern to the 
international community”4, and became the first independent, permanent, international criminal 
court. The Court’s rules were set out in its Rome Statute, which stated that the Court had 
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and the crime of aggression5. Cases regarding these crimes could be referred to the Court 
in one of three ways: either through State referral, through initiation by the Prosecutor (propriu 
motu investigations) and lastly via referral from the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 
Regarding the first two methods of referral, at least one of the parties involved had to be a 
member state of the ICC in order for the Court to proceed with the case. This was due to the 
understanding that the Court should respect the sovereignty of States, and thus could only 
exercise jurisdiction over those States which had accepted its Statute. Cases referred to the Court 
via the UNSC did not require the consent of those under investigation, and referrals could be 
made against or on the behalf of States that were not members of the ICC. This provision had been 
inserted to reflect the special position the UNSC had in maintaining world peace, as set out in its 
Charter. 
Despite being included in the original Statute, the Court did not actually have jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression when it was established in 2002 – this because the Preparatory Commission 
of the ICC had not been able to arrive at a decision regarding the definition of the crime, nor reach 
an agreement on when the Court’s jurisdiction would apply. Nevertheless, it was agreed that the 
Court should work towards including this crime in its Statute, and a paragraph was inserted 
stating that the Court would: 
 “exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision [was] adopted [...] defining the crime 
and setting out the conditions under which the Court [should] exercise jurisdiction”6. 
 A special working group – the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (SWGCA) –  was 
set up to fulfil this aim. The group was to arrive at a solution one year before the Court’s first 
Review Conference, which was to be held in 2010.  
After several years of debate a definition on the crime was adopted. Furthermore, two new 
articles concerning the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime (article 15bis and article 15ter) were 
inserted. These articles set out rules regarding when the Court could exercise its jurisdiction over 
crime of aggression cases, which differed from the ones that applied for the other crimes under 
the Court’s jurisdiction. Article 15bis – which dealt with the Court’s jurisdiction regarding crimes 
referred to it by States or started by the Prosecutor – was especially different. The article limited 
                                                             
4 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998, article 5, p.3 
5 Ibid. 
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the Court’s jurisdiction in that it could not proceed with cases concerning a crime of aggression 
committed by a State Party if said State had declared that it did not accept the Court’s jurisdiction 
over this crime7. Furthermore, the Court did not have jurisdiction over a crime of aggression 
committed by a national from a non-member State, as well as not having jurisdiction over a crime 
of aggression committed on the territory of a non-member State8. The Prosecutor would also 
have to ascertain whether the UNSC had “made a determination of an act of aggression”9  before 
proceeding with a certain case. If the UNSC did not make such a determination within six months, 
the Court could still proceed with the case, provided that its Pre-Trial division had “authorized 
[sic] the commencement of [an] investigation in respect of a crime of aggression”10. The rules 
governing cases brought to the Court via UNSC referrals (included in article 15ter) remained the 
same. 
The amendments regarding the crime of aggression will enter into force following a decision 
taken by State Parties to activate the jurisdiction. This decision is to be taken after the 1st of 
January 201711. Furthermore, the amendments will only begin to apply one year after thirty State 
Parties have ratified or accepted them. So far, six States have ratified the amendments, 
specifically: Liechtenstein, Samoa, Trinidad and Tobago, Luxembourg, Estonia and Germany12.  
1.2 Relevance, aim and research questions  
The above introduction shows that the article governing the Court’s jurisdiction when it comes to 
State and Prosecutor referrals of crimes of aggression (article 15bis) is markedly different from 
the jurisdiction that applies to the other crimes included in the Court’s Statute. Because of this, 
the article has been met with much debate, where the debate can be split into two main camps. 
On the one side, there are those who view the article as suspicious due to the fact that it limits the 
ICC’s jurisdiction whilst at the same according the UNSC a higher level of involvement in these 
cases. On the other side, there are those who view the Kampala amendments as an important step 
towards ending impunity for the crime of aggression, and which praise the Court for finally 
having arrived at an agreement that was adopted by consensus. However, when reading the 
discussions around this article I found that there was a lack of any research based arguments. 
There was specifically no research which looked at the negotiation process within the group 
(namely the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression) responsible for the creation of 
the article. I believe that this is a relevant field of research, as it could help in gaining a further 
understanding for the International Criminal Court and the challenges faced by it, as well as 
shedding some light on a part of the Court that as of yet has not been looked at in detail. In 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
6 Ibid., see footnote, p.3 
7 UN General Assembly, op. cit., article 15bis, paragraph 4, p. 12 
8 Ibid., article 15bis paragraph 5, p. 12 
9 Ibid., article 15bis paragraph 6, p. 12 
10 Ibid., article 15bis paragraph 8, p. 12 
11 Ibid., article 15bis, paragraph 3, p. 12 
12 The global campaign for the ratification and implementation of the Kampala amendments on the crime of aggression. Status of ratification and 
implementation. Accessed 05-07-2013 
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looking at the discourse which led to the creation of this controversial article, I hope to be able to 
add to the discussion surrounding its merits and limitations, by providing an understanding for 
how it came to be.  
The aim of the thesis is therefore to gain an understanding for the debate which took place within 
the SWGCA, particularly regarding discussions that led to the paragraphs which:  
1) limit the Court’s jurisdiction regarding the crime of aggression to cases where all parties 
involved have ratified the amendment (article 15bis, paragraphs 4 and 5), and,  
2) state that the Court must ascertain whether the UNSC has made a determination before it can 
proceed with an investigation, and if such a determination is not made, proceed with an 
investigation as long as the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC consents (article 15bis, paragraph 6 to 8)  
This will be done by conducting an archaeological discourse analysis of the documents from the 
negotiation process within the “Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression”, which took 
place between 2004 and 2009.  
I will be answering the following research questions:  
1. How did the discourse around these paragraphs develop within the SWGCA?  
2. How can Foucault’s theory on power-knowledge be used to explain this development? 
3. In what way can Foucault’s theory on the productivity of discourse and the interaction 
between discourse and visibilities, help in understanding how the final paragraphs were 
produced?  
The material will then be analysed using Foucault’s theory on power-knowledge, which describes 
the dual relationship between power and knowledge, and his theory on the productivity of 
discourses.   
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2. Theory 
 
In this section I will describe the two theories that I have used to analyse the material collected. 
Both theories were developed by the French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault.  
2.1 Choice of theory 
Although Foucault was not a sociologist of law, and mostly did not concern himself with accounts 
of the law and its effects13 I found him to be relevant for a Sociology of Law thesis.  His theories 
account for ways in which society and its institutions are produced, by accounting for power 
relations within society and their effect on the production of knowledge, as well as accounting for 
the way in which discourse is involved in shaping the world around us. These theories are suited 
to Sociology of law, as they offer another way of analysing the relationship between societies and 
law which concerns itself with looking more at the effects of history and the past on the present.   
In writing this thesis, I wished to steer away from the usual discussion around the ICC, which in 
general concerns itself with discussing to what extent it is controlled by certain countries or by 
the UNSC. Although these are valid discussions, I would like to offer an account of the 
development of the article which does not centre on these ideas but which would try to remain 
more neutral. Because of this, Foucault’s theories seemed a perfect fit.  
The theories were further selected as they concern themselves with explaining discourse and its 
ability to produce the visible elements of society. The theories are not specifically developed to be 
used in explaining how laws are shaped; however, as laws are part of the visible elements of 
society in that they impact our behaviour and our relation to our selves, others and the 
surrounding world, I believe that the theories are well suited nonetheless.  
The remaining part of this section offers an account of the theories that I will be using.  
2.2 Discourse and Power-Knowledge 
2.2.1 Discourse 
Discourse generally describes “written or spoken communication or debate”14. Foucault adds 
more depth to this definition by presenting the view that the discourses that occur have the 
ability to produce or change the subject they are discussing15. Furthermore, different types of 
discourse (termed “discursive formations”) exist, and these can be separated from one another 
based on that the objects which the discourse produces “finds in it [the discourse] its place and 
law of emergence”16.  
                                                             
13 Wickham, Gary (2010)”Foucault and law”, in R. Banakar & M. Travers (Red.) An introduction to law and social theory, p. 248 
14Definition found in Oxford Dictionaries 
15 Kendall, Gavin & Wickham, Gary (1999) Using Foucault’s methods. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications Inc., p. 34 
16 Foucault, Michel (1972) The archaeology of knowledge. Great Britain: Tavistock Publications Limited, p. 44 
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When discussing discourse and its effects, Foucault speaks of the interplay between the sayable 
and the visible, where the visible refers to those “non-discursive” elements of society (such as our 
bodies and different institutions) which we can observe, and which we perceive as being tangible; 
and the sayable denotes the discourse. By saying that the two terms are connected to one another, 
Foucault is stating that, not only are visibilities produced by the sayable (the discourse), but that 
these in turn have an effect on discourses in that they define what can be spoken about and in 
what way. The fact that discourse produces the subject of discussion does not however mean that 
the visible, “non-discursive” elements did not exist prior to them being spoken about – simply 
that the way in which they are viewed and their meaning, stems from the discourse surrounding 
them – nothing exists in a “discursive vacuum”17. 
Foucault also presents the understanding that there is “no inside” to discourse – meaning that 
there is no deeper meaning hidden behind what is said, a meaning that can be tied to a certain 
person or that person’s thought process. Thought is not to be understood as some higher thing – 
instead, it is simply a term used to denote the “material surfaces of appearances”18, which result 
from the operations of discourse.  
2.2.2 Power-Knowledge 
”There are two major effects of power: first, that power draws out and induces the conditions under which it 
increasingly comes into play, and second the increasingly dense  relation between power and the production 
of truth”19. 
Foucault's understanding of power differs from the more “traditional” view in the way that power 
is not only seen as something negative, or as something that is used repressively. Instead, 
Foucault's notion of power states that power, in much the same way as discourse, is productive 
(it produces knowledge) and a strategy employed to “keep things going”20. It is not a thing in 
itself, but simply the term “that one attributes to a complex strategical situation in a particular 
society”21. Power is a strategy which maintains “a relation between the sayable and the visible”22, 
which, as well as being the two components of discourse, constitutes the two “poles” of 
knowledge. There is therefore a relationship between power, discourse and knowledge, where 
power acts on discourse and controls what is said and produced and what is adopted as 
knowledge. “A power relation is a discursive relation”23 .  
The sayable within a society bears more weight than the visible – there are more statements 
made than visibilities. If taken like this, it would seem that visibilities would be in danger of 
exhaustion. This is however not the case. Foucault's understanding of power and knowledge 
                                                             
17 Kendall, Gavin & Wickham, Gary,  op. cit., p. 38 
18 Ibid., p. 37 
19 Barker, Philip (1998) Michel Foucault: an introduction. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, p. 28 
20 Kendall, Gavin & Wickham, Gary, op. cit., p. 48 
21 Barker, Philip, op. cit.,  p. 27 
22 Kendall, Gavin & Wickham, Gary,  op. cit., p. 48 
23 Ibid., p. 48 
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serves in trying to explain how the visible is not exhausted by the sayable, despite the latter’s 
“primacy” over the other24. Foucault states that the two poles of knowledge – the visible and the 
sayable – find themselves in a state of constant conflict. They “insinuate themselves inside the 
relation between the other and its conditions”25 and are therefore involved in a “double relation”. 
In this way, the visible is not exhausted by the sayable, as the two are influenced by each other in 
terms of the ability for them to exist. 
Furthermore, power does not belong to a certain group of people; it is not the “prerogative of 
'masters”26. Instead, “power comes from everywhere”27, and circulates between all individuals in 
society28. Because of this, all individuals both experience and exert power at the same time. We 
are therefore all involved in the production and maintenance of power, whilst at the same time 
the way in which we view ourselves and the world around us is shaped by the power in society. 
Power occurs via forces, where forces are understood as the “actions upon actions of others”29. It 
requires that all parties to the power relation are “recognised and sustained as a person who can 
act”30. In this way, power is not something that one can be repressed by, as power existing 
between two individuals assumes that both can act freely – whether this be in agreement with 
each other or not. In fact, Foucault states that power can only exist in situations where there is 
resistance to it31, this because resistance creates a new form of discourse, which therefore sets 
out new forms of knowledge, which in turn influence the forces of power.  
Power is intentional, as individuals use power as a strategy to drive a certain action in society and 
therefore calculate the aims they wish to achieve. However, power is unreliable in that you cannot 
predict its exact effects – this because the effects of power are related to the knowledge available, 
which is constantly changing32. Power is not constant, but instead changes with time. This offers 
an optimistic view of power, as it suggests that all knowledge and power can be changed and 
innovated by subjects. However, these subjects are never fully in control of power, and seeking to 
find the meaning of power by searching for the individuals responsible for the power is not 
possible according to Foucault, as no one individual or organisation controls it33.  
 
 
 
                                                             
24 Ibid., p. 48 
25 Kendall, Gavin & Wickham, Gary, op. cit., p.50 
26 Ibid.  
27 Barker, Philip, op. cit., p.27 
28 Ibid., p. 28 
29 Kendall, Gavin & Wickham, Gary, op. cit., p. 48 
30 Ibid.  
31 Ibid., p. 50 
32 Barker, Philip, op. cit., p. 38 
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3. Method 
3.1 Choice of method  
The choice to use Foucault for theory and method came from the fact that whilst reading his 
works it became clear that his theories and methods are dependent on one other. His 
understanding of discourse influences how his method for discourse analysis is used and his 
theory on power and its relationship with knowledge and discourse gives a further understanding 
on how to apply certain parts of the method. For example, part of the method of archaeology 
deals with describing how certain statements are possible within a discourse and this can be 
explained by using his theory on power and how it controls what is said. Because of this, the 
method is not just used to collect material which is then later analysed – instead, analysis was 
done throughout the whole process.  
Foucault did not write at great length on how he intended for this theories and methods to be 
used. This leaves a lot of room for interpreting how they should be used, to accommodate the 
specific research being done. My understanding is based on Foucault’s works and method books 
by other authors, but is in no way a complete representation of everything that he stood for. I 
chose to use his method of “archaeology” as I thought it suited the material that I was 
investigating, seeing as I was planning to look at archives of discourse.  
The remaining part of this chapter is split into two sections, where the first part deals with the 
definition and explanation of the method of archaeology, and the second part describes how this 
method was used together with the theories for the purpose of this thesis.  
3.2 Archaeology 
Archaeology is a method developed by Foucault in order to analyse discourse – more specifically, 
to analyse how discourses from the past have led to and shaped the present.  It looks at 
statements as they occur in “the archives of discourse”34, where archive is defined as “the 
collection of all material traces left behind by a particular historical period and culture”35. 
Archaeology is characterised as a non-interpretive method, one which does not look for the 
“thoughts, representations, images, themes, preoccupations that are concealed or revealed in 
discourses”36, but which instead concerns itself with viewing the “material conditions of thought 
and knowledge”37 – or, the elements that have made the discourse possible.  This stems from 
Foucault’s critique of analysis and research “lend[ing] speech to those traces which […] are not 
verbal”38. The method builds on the principle that “everything is never said”39, and therefore aims 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
33 Ibid.  
34 Kendall, Gavin & Wickham, Gary, op. cit., p. 24 
35 www.michel-foucault.com. Accessed 17-07-2013 
36 Foucault, Michel, op. cit., p. 138 
37 Kendall, Gavin & Wickham, Gary, op. cit., p. 35 
38 Foucault, Michel, op. cit., p. 7 
39 Ibid., p. 118 
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at explaining why only certain statements emerge and what the relationship between different 
statements is40, as well as how the particular statements are reproduced and changed over time41. 
As discourses act upon the visible elements of society, archaeology also concerns itself with 
trying to understand how these visibilities are shaped by the discourse, and how they in turn 
make statements possible.  
Lastly, archaeology tries to avoid seeking “meaning in human beings”42 and therefore does not 
account for the author behind the particular statement being investigated. 
3.3 The process for this thesis 
The archive analysed in this thesis is the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression’s 
archive which contains reports, non-papers and discussion papers issued by the group at 
different meetings, held between 2004 and 2009.  
As archaeology is aimed at explaining the present by referring to past discourse, I began by 
indentifying the statements within article 15bis that I would be investigating and that make up 
the present understanding (or knowledge) of when the Court has jurisdiction regarding crime of 
aggression cases referred to it by States or initiated by the Prosecutor. These were paragraphs 4 
to 8 of article 15bis. These paragraphs were selected after having read through the SWGCA 
documents on the basis that the highest amount of discussion had occurred surrounding the 
issues addressed by these paragraphs. The remaining paragraphs, however interesting, were not 
as fiercely debated and were thus excluded from this thesis as there would have been very little 
material to analyse.   
The paragraphs selected can be split into two categories, where the first two paragraphs deal 
with limitations on Court jurisdiction over certain States regarding crime of aggression cases 
referred by States or initiated by the Prosecutor (category 1), and the remaining three paragraphs 
deal with the Court’s relationship with the UNSC for crime of aggression cases brought to the 
Court’s attention via these methods of referral (category 2).  
The collection of statements was done in chronological order, from the oldest document to the 
latest one. For each document, I read through and highlighted the sections that had to do 
specifically with jurisdiction (the SWGCA also held talks on what the definition of the crime 
should be, so I sorted out discourses regarding this). I then went through this text and searched 
for statements that seemed relevant for the two categories that I had established previously 
(described above). I determined which statements were relevant based on if they made any 
reference to either jurisdiction over States (for category 1) or the UNSC (for category 2). I 
compared each document to previous ones, to see which statements were repeated, which 
disappeared, or if any new statements appeared. The findings from this are presented in the 
                                                             
40 Kendall, Gavin & Wickham, Gary, op. cit., p. 33 
41 Ibid.  
42 Ibid., p. 26 
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material section, and give an understanding on the development of the article over the years (this 
answers my first research question).  
I then applied Foucault’s theories to try to gain an understanding for why these specific 
statements emerged and certain statements changed over time, and why certain ones 
disappeared, by using his theory on the effects of power on the production of knowledge. This 
answers my second research question. I also analysed the effects of any visibilities on the 
discourse, in order to answer my third research question. I took the visibilities that were relevant 
for this research as being the ICC, the UNSC and the ICJ, as these were the three institutions that 
were referred to throughout the discourse, and for which I could gain an understanding on how 
their structure and role was perceived by those involved in the discourse. 
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4. Material 
 
This section describes the development (in chronological order) of the discourse which led up to 
the creation of article 15bis, paragraphs 4 to 8. I refer to those involved in the discourse as 
“delegations”, as this is how they are referred to in the documents. The documents do not specify 
which delegation represented which country – something which could be perceived as negative 
as it prevents any discussions around which country or countries governed the debates. However, 
seeing as the method and theory used in this thesis both aim at not searching for hidden 
meanings and authors behind particular statements, and seeing as I wanted to avoid that type of 
discussion, this did not pose a problem.   
4.1 Chronological account of the discourse around the Court’s jurisdiction  
4.1.1 The discourse in 2004 
The first document available is a report from an informal inter-sessional meeting of the SWGCA, 
held between the 21st and the 23rd of June 200443. The meeting was set up with the aim to discuss 
around the issues surrounding the definition of the crime of aggression, as well as the jurisdiction 
of the Court over this crime. These issues had emerged during the work of the Preparatory 
Commission of the International Criminal Court, back when the Rome Statute was first being 
drafted. These issues were summarised in a Discussion Paper dating from July 200244. Regarding 
jurisdiction, the discussion paper stated that:  
“Where the Prosecutor intends to proceed with an investigation in respect of a crime of aggression, the Court 
shall first ascertain whether the Security Council has made a determination of an act of aggression 
committed by the State concerned”45. 
 If no determination had been made, the Prosecutor must contact the UNSC, so that it could “take 
action, as appropriate, under Article 38 of the Charter of the United Nations”46.  Different options 
were given regarding what the ICC should do if the UNSC determined that no act of aggression 
had occurred: the Court could proceed with the case anyway, the Court should dismiss the case, 
the Court could ask the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) to “make a 
recommendation”47 regarding whether or not an act had occurred, or it could ask that either the 
UNSC or the UNGA contact the ICJ and ask them to make a determination48.  
It was further argued that any decision on the Court’s jurisdiction must complement the power 
that the UN already had in working against the crime of aggression. Certain delegations felt that 
                                                             
43 ICC-ASP/3/SWGCA/INF.1 
44 PCNICC/2002/WGCA/RT.1/Rev.1 
45 PCNICC/20027WGCA/RT.1/Rev.1, p. 1 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid., p.2 
48 Ibid., p.2 
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the UN, and particularly the UNSC, retained exclusive right in determining whether an act of 
aggression had occurred, as article 39 of its Charter stated that the UNSC was responsible for 
determining “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression”49. 
“This exclusive competence [had to be] respected in the provisions on the crime of aggression”50 . 
However, other delegations felt “strong reservations”51 regarding any level of UNSC involvement, 
on the basis that it might “undermine the autonomous definition of the crime of aggression”52, 
particularly with regards to the permanent members of the UNSC, as these could “veto a proposed 
determination that an act of aggression had occurred and thus block criminal investigations”53. 
At the inter-sessional meeting, discussion was held on whether the new provision on the crime of 
aggression should automatically apply to all States that were party to the Rome Statute, or 
whether they could choose to “opt out”. The difference of opinion occurred due to different 
understandings on how to interpret article 121 of the Statute, which deals with how amendments 
to the Statute come into effect. There was a split regarding whether amendments should start to 
apply for all signatories one year after seven-eighths of State Parties had accepted the 
amendment, as was stated in article 121 paragraph 4; or whether each country would have to 
declare its acceptance of the Court having jurisdiction to prosecute its nationals or acts on its 
territory regarding the crime, as was given in article 121 paragraph 5. Some delegations meant 
that paragraph 5 should be used, as this paragraph had been “drafted with the issue of aggression 
in mind”54. Those who called for the use of paragraph 4 stated that this was the better option, as it 
would keep States from “opting-out” of jurisdiction over solely the crime of aggression – 
something that was not desirable as it was felt that the crime of aggression needed to be “treated 
in the same manner as the other crimes”55.  
4.1.2 The discourse in 2005 
A second informal inter-sessional meeting was held between the 13th and 15th of June 2005. Much 
the same debate as in the previous meeting took place regarding if States should be allowed to 
“opt out” of Court jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. States had been aware upon signing 
the Rome Statue that the crime of aggression was to be included, and had therefore already 
“accepted [the Court’s jurisdiction over it] by becoming parties thereto”56. Therefore, they should 
not have the option to “opt out” of this crime. It was again argued that the crime of aggression 
“should not be treated differently from the other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court”57.  In 
retaliation, it was stated that it had not at the time of the drafting of the Rome Statute been 
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understood “what specific problems”58 were posed by the crime of aggression – therefore, States 
should be allowed to choose whether they accepted jurisdiction over this crime or not, without 
needing to withdraw from the Statute completely.  
4.1.3 The discourse in 2006 
Debate continued regarding whether or not the UNSC should be involved in determining whether 
an act of aggression had occurred, before the Court was allowed to proceed with the case. Some 
delegations felt that it was not “within the jurisdiction of the Court to decide whether an act of 
aggression had occurred”59 – therefore, another organ needed to be responsible for this step. 
Others were opposed to increasing the involvement of the UNSC, as they already had the 
possibility “to request the deferral of an investigation or prosecution by the Court”60, and that 
article 13(b) of the Statute “dealt sufficiently with the role of the Security Council”61. 
Furthermore, it was questioned whether the UNSC should be involved in Court proceedings to 
that extent, as the UNSC and the ICC had different “prerogatives”62, when it came to the crime of 
aggression; the UNSC made determinations of whether an act of aggression had occurred, in 
order to take action and stop the situation from developing; whereas the ICC’s purpose was to 
prosecute individuals responsible.  
Because of the disagreement surrounding UNSC involvement, it was suggested that other organs 
could be responsible for determining whether an act of aggression had occurred. The ICJ was 
offered as an alternative, as they had a similar function to the ICC and had previously made 
rulings concerning acts of aggression (although only against States and not individuals).   The 
UNSC on the other hand, had rarely “used the term 'aggression' in its past”63. This idea was also 
met with resistance, as the ICJ applied “different standards of proof than the Court”64, which 
would slow down proceedings and lead to “duplication of effort”65.  
Because certain delegations were opposed to the UNSC having to make determinations of 
whether an act of aggression had occurred when they had never done so in the past, it was 
suggested that the UNSC would not need to make such a determination for the Court to proceed 
with an investigation, but instead could just give the Court a “green light”66, i.e. show that they 
approved of a case being opened.   
There was also discussion regarding whether or not a determination of an act of aggression by 
the UNSC should be binding on the Court, or if it should just be taken as a recommendation. 
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“Many participants voiced a strong preference for a determination that was open for review by 
the Court”67, whilst others felt that the Court should not be allowed to proceed with a case, if the 
UNSC determined that no act of aggression had occurred. This was in keeping with opinions that 
had already been stated in the 2002 discussion paper68.  
The working group met again between the 23rd of November and the 1st of December 2006. The 
report issued from these meetings stated that opinions continued to differ: 
“as to whether the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression should be conditioned on a prior 
determination of the act of aggression by the Security Council or another body outside the Court”69. 
It was suggested that the Pre-Trial Chamber could review cases brought to the Court by a state 
referral or via the proprio motu powers of the Prosecutor, in situations where the UNSC had not 
made a prior determination on an act of aggression concerning the case. This was suggested in 
order to provide an “additional filter against politically motivated action”70. The suggestion was 
met with some concern as it felt that this would “involve the Court in political determinations 
which should be left to the Security Council”71. 
There was no discussion regarding the Court’s jurisdiction over States.  
4.1.4 The discourse in 2007 
By the third inter-sessional meeting, held between the 30th of November and the 14th of December 
2007, statements regarding UNSC involvement in determining whether an act of aggression had 
occurred as a prerequisite for the Court to proceed with a case, had evolved into discussing the 
UNSC as only one out of several options. However, statements were still issued maintaining the 
view that the Security Council should have “exclusive competence”72, as this would “protect the 
Court from accusations of political bias”73. This was in contrast to earlier statements, which had 
expressed doubts over involving the UNSC as they were a political body whose involvement could 
thus politicise the ICC.  
 Furthermore, it was stated that any such determination should not be required for the Court to 
proceed with a case. “Organs outside the International Criminal Court should get an opportunity 
to express themselves”74, however, the Court should still be able to continue with its work if “this 
opportunity [was] not taken.”75 The statements had evolved from describing the involvement of 
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the UNSC as something that was necessary for the Court to begin its investigations, to describing 
it as an involvement that was based on expressing courtesy. 
The discussion regarding a “green light” option was continued. It was stated that this option had 
been “put forward in order to explore a possible middle ground”76 in the debate around whether 
or not UNSC determination of an act of aggression was a prerequisite for the Court proceeding 
with a case or not. The support for this idea had however dwindled by this point, and it was 
stated that the suggestion “found limited support”77. Some delegations felt that it would be a 
positive provision as it would allow the UNSC “to act quickly, by providing it with a further option 
[...]”78 , whilst others maintained that it was not desirable as it would “expand the powers of the 
Security Council [...] and undermine the Court’s independence”79. Despite the limited support for 
this proposal, the Chairman presented a discussion paper80 which included the “green light” 
suggestion as a possible option.  
There was no discussion regarding the Court’s jurisdiction over States.  
4.1.5 The discourse in 2008 
The SWGCA held seven meetings between the 2nd and the 6th of June 2008. At these meetings, 
discussion was resumed regarding whether the Court should have jurisdiction over its current 
member States regarding the crime of aggression after seven-eighths had ratified the amendment 
(as understood in article 121, paragraph 4) or whether the jurisdiction should only apply to those 
member States which accepted the jurisdiction (article 121, paragraph 5). The last time 
discussion was held around the subject (back in 2005), it had been discussed whether States 
should be able to “opt out” of the Court’s jurisdiction regarding the crime. This suggestion had 
been met with a lot of debate, and a new proposal was thus made at this point: instead of having 
the option to “opt out” of the jurisdiction, States would have to “opt in”. Proponents of this view 
felt that this approach would respect the “sovereign decisions of States to be bound by [an] 
amendment [...]”81, and that it would allow the Court to exercise jurisdiction “immediately 
regarding those States that accepted the amendment [...]”82, instead of having to wait for seven-
eighths of the State Parties to give their consent to the amendment, which could take many years.  
Previously, statements had been issued stating that all member States would automatically fall 
under the jurisdiction of the Court concerning the crime of aggression, as they had agreed to this 
indirectly when ratifying the Rome Statute. This understanding was repeated during the 2008 
meetings, and similar statements were made regarding it being “unwarranted to treat the crime 
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of aggression as a new crime”83, when it had all along been understood that the crime of 
aggression would be included in the Rome Statute84. If States did not wish to accept the Court’s 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, then they would have to “withdraw from the Statute”85 
completely.  This proposal was met with resistance, as certain delegates felt that States 
withdrawing from the Statute was “undesirable”86 and should be avoided.  
Regarding the involvement of the UNSC, a new proposal was made. This proposal suggested that 
the UNSC would be allowed to “stop an ongoing investigation”87 (the “red light” proposal). The 
UNSC already had the right to do so via article 16 of the Rome Statute, but whilst the halting of 
procedures was temporary according to article 16, the new proposal would allow the UNSC to 
halt the procedures indefinitely. The proposal was based on the understanding that the UNSC 
held the “right to determine that a situation did not amount to an act of aggression”88, and 
stemmed from the discussion around to what extent they should be involved in Court 
proceedings. The proposal was opposed by those delegations which did not see the UNSC as 
having exclusive power in determining acts of aggression, and it was stated that the proposal 
would have a “detrimental effect on the independence of the Court.”89  
The SWGCA held a further five meetings between the 17th and the 20th of November 2008. 
Discussion centred on the second sentence of article 121, paragraph 5, which stated:  
“In respect of a State Party which has not accepted [an] amendment, the Court shall not exercise its 
jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by [this] amendment when committed by the State Party’s nationals 
or on its territory.”90 
A split occurred regarding how to interpret this sentence, specifically concerning what type of 
consent was required for the Court to have jurisdiction. The matter was only discussed for cases 
referred to the Court by States or proprio motu. Regarding UNSC referrals, it was stated the idea of 
consent was “irrelevant”91 as the UNSC could begin cases against any State, regardless of whether 
they had consented to the Court having jurisdiction over a particular crime or not.   
Some delegations felt that the paragraph prevented the Court from having jurisdiction in cases 
which involved “at least one State Party that had not accepted the amendment on aggression”92. 
This view differed from the current jurisdiction for the other crimes under the Court’s Statute, in 
that it required that all those involved in a case of aggression had to have consented to the 
amendment which would give the Court jurisdiction over the crime, in order for an investigation 
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to occur. It therefore called for a “double acceptance of jurisdiction by both the aggressor and the 
victim State”93. This view was met with resistance, and even those who advocated it 
“acknowledged that [it] could lead to illogical results”94. In particular, it was stated that such a 
provision on double acceptance would lead to “differential treatment”95 between non-State 
Parties and State Parties that had not accepted the amendment, as the Court would still have 
jurisdiction to begin cases where the aggressor was a non-State Party (if the crime of aggression 
was directed at a State Party), but it would not have jurisdiction over those cases where the 
aggressor State had not ratified the amendment. Furthermore, if the provision of “double 
consent” was adopted, then the Court would not have jurisdiction over cases where a State Party 
which had not ratified the amendment on the crime of aggression was attacked by another State 
Party, even if this Party had ratified the amendments.  
Some delegations argued that the provision of “double acceptance” should be avoided as it would 
create “different categories of State Parties”96. Nevertheless, the fact that the Court was built on 
States having to consent to its Statute in order for it to exercise jurisdiction meant that statements 
supporting this view were still relevant and could still be produced. Therefore it was decided that 
this issue would be discussed again at a later date.  
During the meetings of November 2008, discussion was continued regarding the “red light” 
proposal, first discussed during the meetings held in June of the same year. There was still limited 
support for the idea, mainly because it was stated that article 16 of the Statute which already gave 
the UNSC the power to halt proceedings was already controversial enough, and no further 
competence should therefore be given to the UNSC as this would threaten the view of the Court as 
an independent institution97. This was similar to the argument that had been present at the 
previous meetings which had also included statements that questioned this proposals effect on 
the Court’s independence.  
4.1.6 The discourse in 2009 
A revised discussion paper98, based on discussions from the meetings of November 2008 was 
presented by the Chairman of the SWGCA, and discussed at the Group’s meetings held between 
the 8th and the 13th of February 2008.  The discussion paper stated that the ICC must ascertain 
whether the UNSC had made a determination of aggression regarding a State that the ICC wished 
to investigate. If a determination that no act of aggression had occurred was made, then the ICC 
should either stop proceedings, or ask its Pre-Trial Chamber, the UNGA or the ICJ to make another 
determination instead99.  These are the same statements that were made in the 2002 discussion 
paper. A new statement concerning the meaning of such determinations emerged at this point, 
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reflecting the previous discussion around the need for the Court to remain independent. This new 
statement described the fact that determinations of acts of aggression by “an organ outside the 
Court shall be without prejudice to the Court’s determination of an act of aggression under its 
Statute”100. This statement should negate the above mentioned statement which stated that the 
Court may not proceed if the UNSC had made a determination that no act of aggression had 
occurred, however, the statement remained.  
The question regarding the level of consent required for the Court to exercise its jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression was discussed further at these meetings. It was reiterated that: 
“the application of article 121, paragraph 5, second sentence, should not lead to differential treatment 
between non-State Parties and State Parties that [had] not accepted the amendment on aggression”101 
By this point, discussion around which paragraph of article 121 (specifically paragraphs 4 and 5) 
should be used when implementing the amendments, had mostly moved towards considering 
paragraph 5 as the option that would be used. Debates still occurred regarding how to interpret 
the second sentence of this paragraph: should the sentence be taken as meaning that the Court 
could not exercise jurisdiction over aggressor State Parties that had not accepted the amendment 
to the crime of aggression, even if the victim State had ratified the amendment; or should it be 
viewed as implying that the Court could exercise jurisdiction in those cases where a victim State 
that was party to the Rome Statute had accepted the amendments, even if the aggressor State 
Party had not?  
An informal inter-sessional meeting was held between the 18th and the 26th of November 2008. 
This was the last meeting of the SGWCA before the Review Conference the following year, during 
which the definition on the crime of aggression, and the jurisdiction of the Court regarding it, was 
adopted. During this final meeting, there were still disagreements regarding whether or not the 
Court should be allowed to exercise jurisdiction over crime of aggression cases involving a 
member State that had not ratified the amendment on the crime of aggression. Some felt that the 
aggressor State had to have accepted the amendment. It was stated that this would “differ from 
the approach taken in the Rome Statute with respect to other crimes”102, but that this was   
”justified by the nature of the crime of aggression and by the need to find a politically acceptable 
solution”103. Others felt that the Court should have jurisdiction in these cases, as it would 
otherwise lead to victim States that had accepted the amendment being left unprotected against 
aggression104. There was also an understanding that certain States “would have the privilege of 
shielding their nations from the Court”105, which should be avoided. It was stated that the Court 
should be allowed to exercise jurisdiction on behalf of a victim State that had accepted the 
amendments, even if the aggressor State had not, as it might otherwise “never be able to exercise 
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jurisdiction, except in case of Security Council referrals.”106 It was further stated that the Court’s 
jurisdiction was “delegated to it by [...] victim State[s]”107 and so it could not ignore this delegation 
simply because the aggressor had not accepted the Court’s jurisdiction over one particular crime. 
4.1.7 Decisions reached at the Review Conference 
After many years of deliberation, the Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression adopted 
“proposals for amendments on the crime of aggression by consensus”108. The proposals were 
presented at the Review Conference held in Kampala, Uganda, between the 31st of May and the 
11th of June 2010. The proposal still contained different options regarding how the Court should 
proceed if the UNSC determined that no act of aggression had occurred, however, it was finally 
agreed that any determinations by outside organs (including the UNSC) should not prejudice the 
Court, and a determination that no act of aggression had occurred would therefore not halt 
proceedings. If the UNSC did not determine whether an act of aggression had occurred or not 
within six months, the Prosecutor could proceed with a case, “provided that the Pre-Trial division 
had authorized [sic] the commencement of [an] investigation”109.  This provision gave the UNSC 
less competence, than had been discussed during the SWGCA meetings.  
It was further decided that the Court would only be allowed to exercise jurisdiction over conflicts 
involving member States. Furthermore, the aggressor State involved in the conflict had to have 
ratified the amendment on the crime of aggression and thus accepted the Court’s jurisdiction, in 
order for an investigation to begin. In this case, the more limited suggestion regarding the Court’s 
jurisdiction was adopted, at the expense of the suggestion calling for the same type of jurisdiction 
that applied to the other crimes under the Rome Statute.  
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5. Analysis 
5.1 The creation of paragraphs 4 and 5 
5.1.1 The effects of power on the production of knowledge  
The above account shows that many different discussions and suggestions were presented during 
the SWGCA’s meetings regarding when the Court should have jurisdiction over States for cases 
involving the crime of aggression. The final provision adopted – which stands as the current 
knowledge on when the Court has jurisdiction over this crime – was only one of several options 
presented during the course of the debates. Statements that called for the jurisdiction to be the 
same as for the other crimes fell away by the time of the Review Conference, despite having been 
present throughout much of the debate. This suggests that something must have caused these 
statements to “disappear”, and keep them from becoming part of the knowledge regarding when 
the ICC has jurisdiction over crime of aggression cases referred to it by States or initiated proprio 
motu by the Prosecutor. Foucault’s theory on power and its effects on the production of 
knowledge can be applied to analyse this development.  
According to Foucault, power is a strategy employed by individuals to drive actions in society 
towards a particular aim110. The general aim of the SWGCA was to arrive at a definition on the 
crime of aggression, as well as reach an agreement on the Court’s jurisdiction over this crime. 
Regarding the aim of reaching an agreement on jurisdiction, different “discursive formations” 
developed that held different views on the type of jurisdiction that should be agreed upon. 
Discursive formation describes different types of discourses, which can be separated from one 
another based on the object that they create through the statements included in the discourse111. 
When referring to these different views as discursive formations, I therefore mean that they are 
different in that they are aiming at producing a different type of jurisdiction for the Court than the 
other formations were. These formations therefore employed power in different ways, to help in 
reaching their specific aim. The first formation wanted the same provisions as those that applied 
to the other crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction to apply to the crime of aggression. This view 
was based on the understanding that the Court should not treat the crime of aggression 
differently than the other crimes. In trying to achieve this aim, the proponents of this view left out 
any statements which would work against their aim – so any statements that brought attention to 
the fact that a different treatment of the crime of aggression could be warranted. Statements 
highlighting the importance of the Court being viewed as a united front, and statements that 
brought attention to the fact that State Parties had already “accepted [the Court’s jurisdiction over 
it] by becoming parties thereto”112 were presented instead. Those striving for this aim also 
suggested that the amendments to the Rome Statute regarding the crime of aggression should 
apply automatically to all its signatories, once seven-eighths of the States had declared their 
acceptance. This form of ratification would help in achieving the aim of maintaining a unified 
Court, as it would require that all signatories of the Rome Statute accept the crime of aggression. 
                                                             
110 Barker, Philip, op. cit., p. 38 
111 Foucault, Michel, op. cit., p. 44 
  
  
25 
 
25 
In this case, power was used strategically by stating that the relevant provision on the adoption of 
amendments regarding the crime of aggression was the one given in article 121, paragraph 4. 
Statements which aimed at promoting the article as the correct choice were repeated throughout 
the process: it would lead to a unified Court and States would not be given as much of a chance to 
opt out of the Statute.  
In contrast, the second formation – which aimed at working towards a limitation of the Court’s 
jurisdiction –used statements that would support the view that the jurisdiction as it stood now 
was not acceptable due to the “specific problems”113 associated with crimes of aggression. What 
these problems were was never brought up, however the statement still managed to create 
enough doubt for the formation to continue advocating working towards a new type of 
jurisdiction. Ultimately, it is the suggestion made by this formation that “wins”. If a more 
traditional view on power and its effects had been employed to analyse this, the explanation that 
followed could have been that the formation advocating this “winning” view held more power 
than the other, and had used this power to quash the thoughts and views of the opposition. 
However, according to Foucault, power is not something that is possessed by anyone, let alone by 
a specific group114. The fact that this suggestion was the one that won out – despite that it was 
more controversial as it questioned the then-current knowledge regarding when the Court had 
jurisdiction and when it did not – must therefore have been due to something other than 
repression of the opposite side’s views and opinions.  
The fact that the more “controversial” view won out reflects on Foucault’s understanding that no 
knowledge is constant, and that all things can be changed. Instead of being a negative form of 
control and repression possessed by a select few, power is everywhere and flows freely between 
individuals. Because of this, discourse held by one group would influence that of other groups 
which are involved in the same discourse. Within the discussions of the SWGCA, discourses 
(which are composed of statements that have been issued to work towards a specific aim) within 
one of the two formations, impacted on the discourse conducted by the other formation, in that it 
allowed new statements to be produced in answer to whatever had been previously said. The fact 
that the formation calling for the same jurisdiction to be used stated that any State which did not 
approve of the jurisdiction could be given the chance to “withdraw from the Statute”115, was 
offered in retaliation to the opposing formations’ argument that consent over the Court’s 
jurisdiction on the crime of aggression could not simply be expected from all States just because 
they were party to the Rome Statute, as the crime of aggression posed new problems that had not 
been previously understood. This statement reflects the fact that the debate that occurred was 
two-sided, as statements made by one side were considered by the other when it came to future 
discussions.    
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The statement that States who did not approve of the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression should “withdraw from the Statute”116, gave the opposing formation a further 
statement to retaliate against in order to move the debate towards accepting their view. The 
formation could continue working towards their aim of limiting the Court’s jurisdiction, by using 
this statement from the opposing formation to show that their viewpoint would be 
“undesirable”117 – thus lending more strength to their own suggestion, which would not require 
that States withdrew from the Statute in its entirety.  
As well as producing knowledge, power is also affected by knowledge. The knowledge present at 
the start of the SWGCA discussions regarding the Court’s jurisdiction was that the Court could 
exercise its jurisdiction in situations involving at least one member State, in accordance with 
article 12 of the Rome Statute. There was a further understanding which held that the Court 
should not exercise its jurisdiction over a State concerning a crime covered by an amendment, if 
this amendment had not been accepted by the State: 
“In respect of a State Party which has not accepted [an] amendment, the Court shall not exercise its 
jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by [this] amendment when committed by the State Party’s nationals 
or on its territory.”118 
This knowledge came to direct the way in which power could be used, as it limited the discussion 
regarding jurisdiction to be held in a way that did not completely negate this knowledge. Bringing 
this knowledge into the discussions meant that future statements had to in some way 
acknowledge the fact that the Court should not exercise jurisdiction over a certain State without 
said State’s consent. The two formations presented different interpretations of what this sentence 
meant with regards to determining the jurisdiction of the Court. The formation calling for a more 
limited jurisdiction and for each States rights to express whether or not the accepted the Court’s 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, interpreted the sentence in a more literal way than the 
opposing side. Their arguments therefore came to be more grounded on knowledge, which may 
explain why their argument “won”, despite having been the more controversial one at the 
beginning of the SWGCA’s discussions. The fact that this particular sentence was brought into 
play had an effect on the discursive relation between the two formations, in that it allowed the 
formation which used its more literal interpretation to continue pushing their ideas forward, at 
the expense of the other formation’s ideas, finally resulting in the former formation’s 
interpretation of when and over whom the Court should have jurisdiction being adopted at the 
Review Conference.  
5.1.2 The effects of the interaction between the visible and the sayable 
Prior to the SWGCA beginning its discussions, the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction, 
regarding cases referred to it via States or proprio motu, was understood as applying to those 
cases where at least one of the states involved - be it the aggressor state or the victim state – was 
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party to the Statute119. This shows that the Court is shaped around the idea that it can only 
exercise its jurisdiction when there is consent for it to do so, and that this consent is expressed by 
ratifying its Statute. The understanding of the Court as needing to be based on consent came to 
influence the discourse surrounding its jurisdiction for the crime of aggression, as it allowed 
statements and debates to emerge regarding the level of consent that should be sought after with 
regards to this particular crime. Statements questioning whether it was enough for only one of 
the states involved in a conflict to have ratified the Statute could emerge due to the Court being 
structured in this way. If the Court had been structured in a way that gave it the rights to exercise 
jurisdiction over any State, regardless of whether this State approved of the Court’s Statute, then 
a discussion aimed at working towards a jurisdiction based on consent may not have found as 
much support as it did in this case.  
5.2 The creation of paragraphs 6 to 8  
5.2.1 The effects of power on the production of knowledge 
 In the 2002 discussion paper, statements had already been made which suggested giving the 
UNSC a larger level of involvement in cases concerning crimes of aggression, than it currently 
held with respect to the other crimes under the Court’s Statute. It was suggested that the 
Prosecutor of the ICC should “ascertain whether the Security Council [had] made a determination 
of an act of aggression”120, before beginning investigations. This statement is the one that came to 
be adopted as paragraph 6 of article 15bis of the Rome Statute, during the Review Conference in 
2010. It therefore managed to remain relevant and to not be replaced by another provision, 
despite the many different counter-claims that were made. By applying Foucault’s theory on 
power – specifically his understanding that power is exercised through resistance – an 
explanation for this longevity can be given.  
The proposal that the ICC would have to turn to the UNSC before it could even begin 
investigations into a suspected crime of aggression was from the start met with much criticism. 
Delegations felt that current provisions of the Rome Statute “dealt sufficiently with the role of the 
Security Council”121, and that no further level of involvement was needed. In retaliation, it was 
stated that the UNSC held exclusive competence in determining whether acts of aggression had 
occurred, and that this competence needed to be respected by the ICC. Similar to the discussion 
surrounding the Court’s jurisdiction over States, the discussion in this case can also be said to 
have occurred between different “discursive formations”, although a few more can be found in 
this case. The views presented by these formations also evolved  and changed more than those 
presented by the formations that grew out of the discussion surrounding the Court’s jurisdiction 
over States.  One formation called for a higher level of UNSC involvement; another called for the 
same level of involvement as was currently provided in the Rome Statute (i.e. the UNSC could 
refer cases to the Court); whilst a third called for an even smaller role (according to this view, the 
                                                             
119 UN General Assembly, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (last amended 2010), 17 July 1998, article 12 
120 PCNICC/2002/WGCA/RT.1/Rev.1, p. 1 
121 ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF., p. 10 
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Court should not even be allowed to refer cases concerning this crime, let alone have any say in 
whether the Court proceeded with a case or not). Those favouring a higher level of UNSC 
involvement used statements that described the UNSC as more competent than the Court. In 
doing so, arguments could be advanced which called for UNSC involvement as a means of 
ensuring that the ICC did not overstep its boundaries. Resistance was offered to these statements 
by those wishing to limit the UNSC’s power, and those wishing to maintain it at its current level. 
Whereas the first formation questioned the Court’s competence, these formations questioned the 
UNSC’s competence, based on the fact that the UNSC was a political institution and therefore had 
different “prerogatives”122 to the ICC.  
The level of resistance, and the amount of different opinions presented, meant that all views were 
given many statements to shape themselves around, which lead to a more diverse discussion than 
the one concerning the Court’s jurisdiction over States. In this way, all views were maintained 
within the SWGCA for the majority of the process, despite being so different from one another. 
The fact that resistance occurred at this level suggests that the power exerted by the formations 
was sufficient enough for all others to take note of. If no resistance had been given, this could 
have suggested that an idea was not viewed as important enough to be considered, which gives 
quite a positive view of the discussion within the SWGCA in that it suggests that it was conducted 
in a way that allowed for all views to be heard and considered.  
When reading through the documents, it becomes clear that the provision adopted regarding 
UNSC involvement is one that calls for a considerably lower level of involvement than was 
suggested during the meetings of the SWGCA. The “green light” proposal, for example, would, if it 
had been adopted, have given the UNSC a further chance to involve itself in Court proceedings, as 
it would have had the added option to simply give its consent to proceedings, as well as the option 
to make a determination of whether or not an act of aggression had occurred. This proposal 
emerged out of the need to try to reach some sort of middle ground, to appease those delegations 
which called for UNSC involvement and those which questioned the UNSC’s ability to make 
determinations on acts of aggression. Here we can see that the discourse which occurred between 
the two formations led to the creation of a new form of discourse, which would not have 
appeared had there been consensus regarding the level of involvement of the UNSC. This further 
illustrates what Foucault meant by stating that power could only be exercised when met by 
resistance.  
The doubt felt by some delegations in making a UNSC determination of an act of aggression a 
prerequisite to the Court being able to proceed with a case, was based on the knowledge that the 
UNSC had rarely referred to acts of aggression in its past. The knowledge in this case came to 
influence the strategic use of power, as it helped to argue the idea of a lower level of UNSC 
involvement, based on the fact that they simply were not competent to be involved to the point 
where their determination would act as a prerequisite for the Court to begin an investigation.  
                                                             
122 ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF., p. 10 
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As discussed above, many of the views expressed during early stages of the SWGCA meetings 
were present all throughout the process, up until the time of the Review Conference. However, 
one proposition was made that received very little support from the start and was subsequently 
abandoned quite quickly. This view suggested that the UNSC be given an extra right to halt 
proceedings indefinitely (the “red light” proposal). This proposal built on the current right of the 
Court to halt proceedings for a period of up to twelve months, as accorded to it by article 16 of the 
Rome Statute (this period could also be extended if needed). The proposal developed out of the 
debate regarding whether UNSC determination should be viewed as a prerequisite or not, and 
aimed at trying to offer a compromise by still including the UNSC in the process, as was desired 
by some delegations, but by removing their ability to halt proceedings before they had even 
started, as had been questioned by other delegations. This proposal met with much resistance 
which according to Foucault’s understanding that power operates when met with resistance, 
should have led to this particular understanding being pushed forward. However, this was not the 
case. This could suggest that the form of resistance here was the “wrong” type of resistance, in 
that it was so uniform that it did not allow for any discussion regarding the proposal, which could 
have led to the introduction of new statements.  
5.2.2 The effects of the interaction between the visible and the sayable 
The discussion in the previous section centres mostly on analysing how the discourse which led 
to the production of paragraphs 6 and 7 developed within the SWGCA. Regarding paragraph 8, 
Foucault’s theory on the interaction between the visible and the sayable – the two components 
that make up his notion of discourse – has more to offer in explaining how the discourse 
surrounding this paragraph was developed. This theory states that the visible elements influence 
the discourse that can be conducted regarding these visibilities. The visibilities relevant in this 
case are the ICC, the UNSC and the ICJ. The UNSC is the first organ outside of the ICC that is 
discussed as potentially having the right to be involved in cases involving potential crimes of 
aggression. The Charter of the UN, specifically article 39, describes the UN as being responsible 
for determining “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of 
aggression”123. This is a responsibility that has been associated with the UN since its Charter was 
adopted in 1945, and therefore the view of the UN as an organ that is heavily involved in the 
maintenance of peace influences the discourse that can be conducted around it and the merits or 
limitations which would come from including a certain part of its structure in ICC proceedings 
regarding determinations of acts of aggression.  Of course, not all delegations were of the view 
that the UN was an institution that should have primacy of the ICC, and this is reflected in 
statements maintaining that the ICC should remain an independent Court. However, the discourse 
is still affected by the visibility in that the UN cannot completely be ignored, which invites 
discussions surrounding how it should be involved.  
The UNSC is offered as the first alternative, but as discussed in the previous section, this 
suggestion is met with many counter-claims, mostly based on the wanting to keep UNSC 
involvement to a minimum due to it being a political organ. As a result of this, it was suggested 
                                                             
123 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, 1 UNTS XVI, Chapter VII, article 39 
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that another organ could be responsible for determining whether an act of aggression had 
occurred. The organ suggested was the ICJ, which had the merit of being a judicial body – thus any 
statements used by delegations opposed to UNSC involvement  based on the fact that it is a 
political body – could not be presented. However, the structure of the ICJ posed other problems, 
in that it applied ““different standards of proof than the Court”124”. The visibility here is of a court 
that is not compatible with the ICC. Discussions around this structure as a viable option are 
therefore abandoned.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
124 ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/INF., p. 11 
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6. Conclusion and discussion 
6.1 Conclusion  
This thesis aimed at gaining an understanding for the negotiation process that took place within 
the SWGCA, and how this negotiation process developed into paragraphs 4 to 8 of article 15bis of 
the Rome Statute, by analysing the discourse within the group concerning these paragraphs. 
Foucault’s theory on the effects of power on the production of knowledge, as well as his theory on 
the productivity of discourse, was used in order to analyse how the discourse developed over 
time.  
Regarding the development of paragraphs 4 and 5 of article 15bis, which restricted the Court’s 
jurisdiction to only applying in those cases where: 1. all States involved in the conflict were State 
Parties to the Rome Statute and, 2. the aggressor State had not “opted out” of the Court’s 
jurisdiction over this crime, the following was found:  
The discourse within the SWGCA regarding this topic was from its start split into two opposing 
camps, where one side wished to keep the same jurisdiction that applied to the other crimes 
under the Court’s Statute, whilst the other side wanted to limit the Court’s jurisdiction in this 
case. The delegations calling for a more limited jurisdiction “won” in the end, as they were able to 
use power in a strategic way that proved useful to their aim. The fact that the Court was built on 
principles of consent meant that statements could be issued which called for the Court to 
consider this principle when deciding on its jurisdiction over States regarding the crime of 
aggression. Opposing views which built on stating that the Court needed to remain unified and 
not treat the crime of aggression differently from the other crimes under the Court’s Statute 
remained as viable options for much of the discussions, however, they were not adopted into the 
Statute as the opposing view could present more statements that were based on prior knowledge 
and held a discourse that was more closely related to the structure of the ICC as an institution 
based on consent.  
Regarding the development of paragraphs 6 to 8, which describe the relationship between the 
UNSC and the ICC in cases brought to the attention of the ICC via State referrals or proprio motu 
investigations, the following was found:  
The idea that the UNSC should be involved in some way in State referral and proprio motu 
investigations regarding crimes of aggression, was based on the view of the UNSC as holding a 
special competence with regards to determination of such acts due to provisions set out in its 
Charter. The UNSC came to be constructed as being an organ that should be revered and deferred 
to in regards to these types of crimes, and this perceived visibility impacted the discourse in that 
it led to the production of statements which reflected this. However, the discussion within the 
SWGCA shows that the role given to the UNSC via these paragraphs is limited compared to what 
had been suggested by some delegations during discussions. The final decision stated that the 
Court should ascertain whether the UNSC had made a determination of whether an act of 
aggression had occurred or not, before proceeding with a case against a member State. If the 
UNSC had made such a determination, the Court could proceed – if no such decision had been 
made, the Court could proceed with a case anyway, provided that its Pre-Trial Chamber had 
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authorised an investigation.   These provisions excluded statements that had called for UNSC 
determination to be a prerequisite to the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction, thus reflecting the fact 
that one of the less controversial options came to be incorporated into the Statute.   
The fact that the Pre-Trial Chamber came to hold such a strong role in cases involving crimes of 
aggression, was found to have been the result of this Chamber being presented as the best option, 
due to the structure of the other organs suggested as alternatives (the UNGA and the ICJ) being 
viewed as problematic.  
In conclusion, it can be said that the discourse within the SWGCA was one filled with conflicting 
statements and views, regarding the type of jurisdiction that should be sought after by the Court 
in regards to the crime of aggression. These conflicting views were shaped by the visibilities of 
the institutions referred to in the discussion, as well as by the use of power to achieve specific 
aims, and the knowledge that existed prior to discussions commencing. The fact that so many 
opposing views were presented meant that compromises had to be made throughout the process, 
in order for some sort of progress to be made. By the time of the Review Conference, discussions 
were still being held regarding what the Court’s jurisdiction should be, however, through the art 
of compromise, a consensus agreement was finally reached.  
6.2 Discussion  
6.2.1 Relevance of these findings and possible future research  
The analysis conducted has given a slight glimpse into the discourse which led towards the 
creation of article 15bis of the Statute, and thus hopefully helped in gaining more of an 
understanding for the process which led to the adoption of this article. These findings could be 
relevant in discussing around the “pros and cons” of the article, as they may offer a deeper 
understanding for the complicated process that was involved in arriving at a suggestion that was 
acceptable to those involved in the process. The fact that so many different opinions were 
expressed meant that compromises had to be made, and future research could therefore aim at 
looking at these different compromises and assessing which one was the “best” one to make, and 
if the “right” compromise was made and so on. What would be perceived as “right” could be based 
on the researcher’s own understanding of what the International Criminal Court should stand for, 
so for example, if the researcher was of the view that the Court should be as independent of the 
UNSC as possible, then an assessment of the compromise stated in article 15bis, paragraphs 6 and 
7 which increased the involvement of the UNSC in cases referred by States or initiated by the 
Prosecutor, could be made based on this understanding. By incorporating an account for why this 
compromise was made, a deeper understanding could be gained on the “pros and cons” of the 
compromise. 
Future research could also build on the discussion around why the debate developed in the way it 
did, by using different theories of analysis. The theories that I have used are based on the 
understanding that power is not necessarily a negative thing, and that discourse is productive and 
constantly working towards changing the world around us. This influenced the way in which I 
analysed the material, as I had to keep from making assumptions that power was possessed by a 
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certain group of delegates and that these delegates had used their power to repress delegates 
whom held different views. Research based on the same analysis of the same type of material but 
using a different theory to analyse the material would most likely lead to different findings, which 
could lend a further understanding of the discourse within the SWGCA by offering a different 
perspective on its development.  
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